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Abstract 
In this article we suggest that independent vs. interdependent aspects of the self yield 
different manifestations of psychological reactance and that this is especially relevant in a 
cross-cultural context. In Studies 1, 2 and 4 we showed that people from collectivistic 
cultural backgrounds (individuals holding more interdependent attitudes and values) were 
less sensitive to a threat to their individual freedom than people from individualistic 
cultural backgrounds (individuals holding more independent attitudes and values), but 
more sensitive if their collective freedom was threatened. In Study 3 we activated 
independent vs. interdependent attitudes and values utilizing a cognitive priming method 
and yielded similar results as the other studies hinting at the important causal role of self-
related aspects in understanding reactance in a cross-cultural context. 
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Culture, Self and the Emergence of Reactance: Is there a “Universal” Freedom? 
Freedom of behavior is a pervasive and important aspect of human life. On a group level 
this can be observed by the fact that many nations all over the world have ‘freedom’ or 
‘liberty’ in their state motto, e.g., “Liberté, égalité, fraternité” (France), “Einigkeit und 
Recht und Freiheit” (Germany), “En Unión y Libertad” (Argentina), “Freedom and 
Justice” (Ghana), "Independence, liberty and happiness" (Vietnam). On the individual level 
it is hardly a coincidence that the restriction of personal freedom is such a pervasively used 
punishment in legal as well as in educational contexts. In social psychology the concept of 
freedom is mostly looked at in the context of the individual’s control and choice. Having a 
free choice is highly valued and its elimination is a pervasive predictor of behavior in areas 
as diverse as consumption (Clee & Wicklund, 1980), health (Seibl & Dowd, 1999; Orbell 
& Hagger, 2006), or helping behavior (Krishnan & Carment, 1979). Reactance theory in 
particular emphasizes the importance of “specific” individual freedoms and defines 
conditions under which people react against threats to these freedoms. Herein freedom is 
defined as a person’s belief to be able to engage in a certain behavior and to decide on the 
type of behavior, as well as how it is performed and when (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). 
The phenomena induced by reactance are among the most genuine and universal 
researched in social psychology (for a recent review see Miron & Brehm, 2006). Yet, in 
recent decades, social psychologists’ claim to provide universally valid theories has been 
challenged by culturally important aspects, especially the cultural self-concept. Although 
reactance is typically considered to be pan-cultural, there may be systematic variations 
based on the cultural self. In the current article we argue that culturally formed patterns of 
values and beliefs should contribute heavily to the specific freedoms that people within a 
given context perceive and value and should thus affect the emergence of reactance.  
The Emergence of Reactance 
Reactance theory proposes that when a person believes s/he is free to engage in a 
given behavior, s/he will experience psychological reactance if that freedom is eliminated 
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or threatened (Brehm, 1966). Reactance is defined as a motivational state directed toward 
the re-establishment of the threatened or eliminated freedoms, which should manifest itself 
in an increased desire to engage in the relevant behavior or actual attempts to engage in it 
(Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Reactance theory does not hold that people will 
seek freedom in all situations, but rather that they perceive themselves as having specific 
freedoms and will reassert these under the conditions they know the freedom exists and 
they are able to exercise that freedom (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). The magnitude of 
reactance is a direct positive function of (1) the importance of the freedom, which is 
eliminated or threatened, and (2) the proportion of free behaviors eliminated or threatened. 
Interestingly, a threat or the elimination of a free behavior will frequently be 
located in a social source (Brehm, 1966). When freedom is threatened by social pressure, 
reactance will lead one to resist that pressure and even may induce boomerang effects. In 
their classic study Weiner and Brehm (1966) found that consumers bought more of a 
certain kind of bread when influenced only moderately (“please try”) compared to a 
stronger influence (“you are going to buy”). In a similar vein, a stronger sign on the door 
of a public bathroom installed to prevent people from painting graffiti on the walls (“Do 
not write on these walls under no circumstances”) resulted in more forbidden behavior than 
the weaker phrasing (“Please do not write on these walls”) (Pennebaker & Sander, 1976).  
Although the phenomena described by reactance theory are thought to be universal 
in social psychology, the focus on the importance of individual freedom in reactance 
theory might give reason to view it as a prototypical theory that is limited to the domain of 
individualistic values (Worchel, 2004). As most psychological theories have been created 
by Western researchers and tested with Western participants, they tend to emphasize 
individualistic values and neglect non-Western values, such as relational and collective 
needs and self-definitions (Triandis, 1996). However, culturally developed self-concepts 
may be critical to the definition of freedom, and hence reactance.  
Culture and the Self 
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In recent years, cross-cultural differences in the construction of the self have been 
highlighted by several social psychologists (e.g., Bond & Smith, 1996; Hong & Chiu, 
2001; Kashima, 2002; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 
2002; Triandis, 1996). The cultural self distinguishes between independent and 
interdependent aspects in the human self, often referred to as culturally specific types of 
self-construals (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Many studies (e.g., Kanagawa, Cross, & 
Markus, 2001; Singelis, 1994; Wang, 2001) show that the proportion of these aspects in 
the self-concept of a person stands in relation with the dimension of individualism and 
collectivism that was first investigated by Hofstede (1980): Individualism emphasizes 
individual uniqueness, personal autonomy, and independence, whereas collectivism 
focuses on group harmony, interpersonal relations and interdependence. People engaging 
in individualistic cultures tend to define their self-concept more independently than 
interdependently from others: the freedom to make one’s own choices and express one’s 
own desires and preferences are important. In contrast, people engaging in collectivistic 
cultures tend to define their identity mainly by means of the interconnection with people 
and relevant group-members. They are expected to give first priority to group harmony, 
even when this conflicts with personal desires. Individualistic/ more independent self-
construals are dominant in Western cultures (e.g., North American, Western European), 
whereas collectivistic/more interdependent self-construals are dominant in Eastern and 
Southern cultures (e.g., Asia, Latin America). The individualism–collectivism dimensions1 
have been frequently used as the basis for studying cultural variability and have uncovered 
strikingly different sets of emotions, cognitions, motivations, and social behaviors (for 
overview, Oyserman et al. 2002). Whereas Markus and Kitayama (2003b) argue that 
independent or interdependent selves represent general ways of being or action, others 
                                                
1 Individualism and collectivism can be understood as two independent dimensions, which implies that 
people usually comprise both individualistic and collectivistic aspects of the self, however in different 
proportions (for overview, see Oyserman, et al. 2002). 
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have interpreted “selves” as explicit concepts that can be measured using attitude or value 
scales (e.g., Singelis, 1994). 
How Universal are Reactance Processes? 
Although culturally different facets of the self have been discussed with respect to 
psychological phenomena, their implications for psychological theories have largely been 
neglected. An exception is the work on cognitive dissonance by Hoshino-Browne, Zanna, 
Spencer, Zanna, and Kitayama (2005), and Kitayama, Snibbe, Markus and Suzuki (2004) 
who posit that the core features of dissonance are differentially configured by the cultural 
views of the self as independent or interdependent. With regard to reactance theory similar 
processes might be at work. Worchel (2004) suggests that psychological reactance “is a 
motivational state designed not only to restore freedom, but also to reestablish identity” (p. 
111). Because in Western societies freely chosen behaviors play a critical role in defining 
self-identity, the freedom to control one’s own outcomes helps individuals to establish 
their uniqueness, whereas threatening or eliminating freedom harms a person’s sense of 
individual identity (Worchel, 2004).  
This leads to the question to what extent reactance might be limited to people with 
individualistic attitudes. And indeed, studies show that reactance is positively correlated to 
personality characteristics typical for individualistic cultures, such as autonomy, 
dominance and independence (Buboltz, Woller & Peper, 1999; Dowd, 1999; Dowd & 
Wallbrown, 1993; Dowd, Wallbrown, Sanders & Yesenosky, 1994; Merz, 1983). Imajo 
(2002) showed among Japanese participants that reactance was positively correlated with 
uniqueness and negatively with collectivism. Furthermore, American students (residing 
and taking classes in Japan) reported having almost 50% more choices and perceived their 
choices as being significantly more important to them than Japanese students (Iyengar & 
Lepper, 1999). Moreover, Iyengar and Lepper (1999) found that Anglo American children 
revealed the highest levels of intrinsic motivation and performance when they were 
allowed to make choices for themselves. In contrast, Asian American children were more 
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motivated if a valued ingroup-member (mother or peer) made the decisions for them (see 
also Pöhlmann, Carranza, Hannover & Iyengar, 2007). This suggests that the freedom to 
make personal choices seems less crucial to Asians’ interdependent selves. Markus and 
Kitayama (2003b) contrast a disjoint model of agency (characteristic for Western 
societies), in which culturally defined normatively good actions are “freely” chosen 
depending on people’s own preferences, goals, and intentions from a conjoint model of 
agency (characteristic for Eastern societies), in which “actions are responsive to 
obligations and expectations of others, roles, situations; preferences, goals, intentions are 
interpersonally anchored” (p.7). Thus, the latter actions are not personally controlled (as in 
the disjoint model) but jointly determined, whereby obligations and expectations of others 
are seen as motivating instead of being a force or pressure. This might cause people to feel 
less threatened when others restrict their personal freedom. Interestingly, Savani, Markus 
and Conner (2008) indeed found less reactance among Indian compared to middle-class 
North American participants when the freedom to choose among different attractive pens 
was restricted. 
Taken together, these findings hint at a significantly lower importance of reactance 
phenomena in collectivistic cultures in which a more interdependent understanding of the 
self makes people feel less threatened by restrictions of their freedom. However, does this 
generally yield a limited universality of reactance theory for people with an interdependent 
construction of their self? We think not. Instead of affecting their personal values, threats 
to people’s freedom can also impact central group-related concerns of the self. Even if 
collectivists might be willing to give up individual freedoms, they might still be reluctant 
to give up freedoms of their ingroup. If this is the case, culturally specific differences in 
the emergence of reactance should be observable.  
Independent versus Interdependent Threats to People’s Freedom 
The cultural specificity of constraints to important aspects of the self has been 
shown for the case of cognitive dissonance in the studies by Hoshino-Browne and 
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colleagues (2005): Here a decision for oneself led to more dissonance reduction behavior 
for participants from an individualistic background, whereas a decision for a friend 
resulted in more dissonance reduction for collectivists (for similar findings see Kitayama et 
al., 2004). The authors therefore suggested that different types of threats to consistency 
affect different culturally determined self-concepts. Based on these considerations, we 
hypothesize that the arousal of reactance in different cultures might also be influenced by 
different self-concepts: For more independent selves, freedom might derive from personal 
desires, whereas for more interdependent selves freedom might evolve rather from the 
needs of one’s ingroup. Therefore, for an independent self it should be especially important 
not to be limited in one’s individual or independent freedoms. Consequently reactance 
should arise if the independent self is threatened by the elimination of personal freedoms. 
In contrast, because people engaging in collectivistic cultures tend to define their identity 
mainly through the interconnection with others, they ought to experience reactance when 
their more interdependent self is threatened by the elimination of group or interpersonal 
freedoms. 
We propose that relating reactance processes to culturally specific selves helps to 
expand the scope of reactance theory and to specify the theoretical processes. We assume 
that reactance is not a phenomenon specific to Western cultures but that reactance can be 
observed across cultures when freedom-related aspects of the self are threatened by 
limitations of freedom. However, culturally specific conceptions of the self have to be 
taken into account when predicting reactance reactions. Consequently the situations that 
are likely to give rise to the experience of reactance will be a function of culture.  
The Present Research 
To test our hypotheses, in Study 1 we utilized a reactance paradigm in which 
participants imagined giving up a personal vs. a collective freedom and tested whether 
people from a collectivistic cultural background reacted differently to the two kinds of 
threats to freedom compared to people from an individualistic cultural background. In 
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Study 2 we looked at how these cultural differences in reactance relate to people’s 
culturally formed selves. In Study 3 we activated independent vs. interdependent attitudes 
and values among German participants with a cognitive priming method and predicted 
different reactions with respect to a threat to individual vs. collective freedom. Finally, in 
Study 4 we extended the previous findings by investigating whether the differential 
experience of reactance as a function of culture and type of threat influenced subsequent 
behavioral intentions, namely the intention to help.  
Even though we propose the self to be the crucial variable in explaining 
intercultural differences in the experience of reactance, in order to stay close to how we 
operationalize the construct we will refer to our assessment and priming of the culturally 
determined self in Studies 2 to 4 as self-related independent and interdependent attitudes 
and values. These should have a direct influence on the specific freedoms that people 
within a given context perceive and value and thus affect the emergence of reactance. 
STUDY 1 
In Study 1 we examine whether threat to an individual freedom as compared to a 
collective freedom will lead to differences in the experience of reactance for people with a 
collectivistic cultural background. In other words: Will we find the sort of cultural 
differences for reactance that Hoshino-Browne et al. (2005) and Kitayama et al. (2004) 
have found for self-threat in the form of cognitive dissonance?  
We propose that people from a more individualistic cultural background would feel 
more reactance with regard to a threat to their individual freedom than people from a more 
collectivistic cultural background. However, we further propose that – when their 
collective freedom was threatened – people from a collectivistic cultural background 
would experience as much reactance as people from an individualistic cultural background.  
Method 
Participants and design. One hundred and five (36 male, 68 female, one missing 
value) students of ages from 18 to 41 years from the University of Swansea and the 
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University of Sussex, Great Britain participated in this experiment, which was based on a 2 
(threat: individual vs. collective) x 2 (cultural group: individualistic vs. collectivistic) 
factorial between subjects design. The sample consisted of 54 British and 51 foreign 
students (26 Chinese, 8 Malaysian, 7 German, 4 Japanese, 2 French, 3 Swedish, 1 Italian) 
who indicated they had been living in Britain for a period of one month to five years. 
Procedure.  Students were approached on campus2 and asked to participate in a 
short psychological study. If they agreed they were given a questionnaire, which (after 
some general information about the study) asked participants to imagine a scenario 
regarding a situation in a company. In one condition the scenario focused on an individual 
good, a personal business car that they could use for business trips; in the other condition it 
focused on a common good, a pool of business cars that all employees could use for 
business trips. In the individual threat condition participants were asked to imagine that on 
their way from the office to their business car, a colleague they briefly knew approached 
them and asked for a favor: She was currently conducting negotiations with another 
company in a rural area that was not easily accessible by public transport. Although she did 
not have a business car, she would like to be able to drive to this company. Because she did 
not know anyone else to ask, she asked the participant to lend her his/her car for a week 
and offered the participant her public transport card in exchange. If the participant agreed, 
he/she could not use the car during that time and would have to spend more time for 
his/her own business trips, but would help the colleague to get to the other company faster.  
In the collective threat condition participants were asked to imagine that on their 
way from their office to one of the business cars they read an announcement concerning 
the availability of the business cars. An external branch office in another city was planning 
to start an advertising offensive in their area. Many vehicles were needed to drive around 
and to reach less accessible rural areas for one week. To facilitate this need, the branch 
                                                
2 The Sussex-part of the sample was approached after a lecture and received course credit for the 
participation. 
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office in the other town had requested that the participant’s branch designate some of their 
business cars to this external branch office. If their branch office agreed to provide this 
favor, colleagues, other employees and managers could not use the business cars for their 
trips in their area (instead they were offered the use of public transport cards), but would 
help out the other branch office with their advertising offensive. 
After participants had read the scenario we assessed participants’ feeling of 
reactance with the following items: (1) How reasonable would a favor like that appear to 
you?, (2) How restricted would you feel in your freedom of choice?, (3) How legitimate 
would a favor of lending your business car to an acquainted colleague appear to you?/How 
legitimate would a favor of lending the cars to an external branch that wants to do an 
advertising offensive appear to you?, (4) How much would you feel under pressure by 
being told you are the only one that can provide her this favor?/If participating in the 
decision-making of your branch office, how much would you feel under pressure by being 
told you are the only branch office that can provide them this favor?, (5) How much would 
a favor like that bother you?, and (6) How irritated would you probably feel by a request 
like that? ([1] not at all, [10] very much). Cronbach’s alpha for the composite measure 
“experience of reactance” consisting of these six items (with the items 1 and 3 inverted) 
was a =.66. Finally, we asked some questions regarding participants’ sex, major and 
nationality. In the end participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results 
Following Hofstede (1991) we grouped participants coming from Western 
European countries (Britain, France, Germany, Sweden, and Italy) in the cultural group of 
Western Europeans (n = 67) and participants from East Asian countries (China, Malaysia, 
and Japan) in the cultural group of East Asians (n = 38). We next ran a 2 (threat: individual 
vs. collective) x 2 (cultural background: Western European [individualistic] vs. East Asian 
[collectivistic]) ANOVA on participants’ experience of reactance. This analysis revealed 
the predicted interaction between threat and cultural background, F(1, 101) = 6.44, p = .01, 
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d = .513 (see Table 1 for the means). Simple effects analyses revealed that following the 
individual threat East Asian participants reported significantly less reactance than Western 
Europeans, F(1, 101) = 9.49, p = .003, d = .61. However, with the collective threat the 
difference between Western Europeans vs. East Asians disappeared, F(1, 101) < 1, p > .60. 
Thus, in accordance with our hypothesis that East Asians will experience reactance with 
regard to a collective threat (even though they experience less reactance with regard to an 
individual threat), further analyses revealed that East Asians tended to experience more 
reactance when their collective compared to their individual freedom was threatened, F(1, 
101) = 2.73, p = .10, d = .33, whereas Western Europeans experienced more reactance 
when their individual instead of their collective freedom was threatened, F(1, 101) = 4.09, 
p = .05, d = .40.  
Discussion 
Study 1 showed that people from a collectivistic cultural background showed less 
reactance when a personal freedom was threatened than people from an individualistic 
cultural background. This is a conceptual replication of the findings by Savani et al. (2008) 
who also found less reactance among collectivistic participants (people from India) 
compared to middle-class North Americans using a different paradigm. Savani et al. (2008) 
explained their findings within the disjoint vs. conjoint model of agency (Markus & 
Kitayama, 2003b) implying that reactance theory is rooted in the disjoint model of agency. 
Because, in the disjoint model, people have the desire to choose as they personally wish, in 
that their decision reflects their own preferences, goals, or intentions, they should 
experience reactance when their personal freedom is threatened. However, people acting 
within the conjoint model of agency would not be expected to experience reactance if they 
are limited in their personal choices because part of being a good agent implies putting 
aside personal preference. Yet, this does not necessarily imply that the scope of reactance 
theory is limited to the disjoint model of agency. As Study 1 clearly showed, people from 
                                                
3 We checked whether gender had an effect on the dependent variable but this was not the case. 
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collectivistic cultures (with a conjoint understanding of agency) did experience reactance 
when their group’s freedom was in danger. 
Moreover, although the result that collectivists showed less reactance when giving 
up an individual freedom can be understood by assuming that they felt less threatened by 
having to put aside their personal goals, another interpretation is also possible: Maybe they 
experienced less reactance because they felt an obligation to do a favor for a work 
colleague. Although we did not describe this person as a friend, participants might have 
considered him or her as an ingroup member. This would be in accordance with the work 
of Miller and Bersoff (1998), who found that Americans indicated feeling more 
responsible for others they liked (implying preferences to be important for moral 
judgments). Indian participants, on the other hand, felt morally obligated to help 
everybody, regardless of their likeability, portraying agency in a more conjoint manner. 
Therefore, in order to generalize our results to personal threats to freedom that do not 
involve another person toward whom one could feel obliged, in Study 2 we chose a 
different kind of threat: the prohibition of a certain dental care product. 
In addition, in Study 1 we operationalized cultural differences looking at people 
from individualistic versus collectivistic cultural groups. Viewing psychological 
differences from these dimensions could be described as telescoping differences that are in 
fact inherent in the selves (and in self-related attitudes and values) of people in all cultures. 
Indeed, it seems that the self is the key variable to which many cross-cultural differences 
can be traced back. Oyserman and Lee (2008), for example, have reviewed a myriad of 
studies showing that the mere priming of individualistic or collectivistic aspects of the self 
led to differences in cognitive style, relationality, and judgements within samples across 
cultures. This suggests that culture may be viewed as a distal influence on behavior, whilst 
a culturally determined self should be the more proximal factor. Therefore, the question 
arises of whether differences in the experience of psychological reactance can be 
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accounted for by differences in the culturally determined self. In the further studies we 
investigated this question. 
STUDY 2 
In Study 2 we, first, wanted to test whether we could replicate the finding that a 
threat to an individual freedom leads to less reactance for people with a collectivistic than 
for those with an individualistic cultural background by using a paradigm in which 
participants would not feel morally obliged to honor the request of another person. 
Moreover, as we have theorized that the cultural differences in reactance relate to the 
impact a threat to personal freedom has on a person’s self, we predicted this effect would 
be reflected in differences in culturally determined attitudes and values, which we expected 
to be more interdependent in participants from a more collectivistic cultural background 
and more independent in participants from a more individualistic cultural background. 
Study 2 therefore tested two hypotheses: (1) People from a collectivistic culture should be 
less likely to experience reactance than people from an individualistic culture when their 
personal freedom was threatened; (2) Although cultural background should predict the 
extent of reactance experienced, the culturally determined independent vs. interdependent 
attitudes and values should be an even better predictor of reactance in this situation. 
Method 
Participants and design. Three hundred and thirty seven introductory psychology 
students from DePaul University in Chicago (225 female and 112 male) who took part in 
the prescreening at the beginning of the semester participated in this study. The study is 
based on a one-factorial design with two conditions (cultural group: individualistic vs. 
collectivistic). The sample consisted of 274 European Americans and 63 Asian Americans. 
The data of fourteen participants had to be excluded from the analyses because of missing 
values, three were excluded because their scores were more than 2.5 standard deviations 
away from the mean. This left 261 European and 59 Asian Americans in our analyses. 
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Procedure. Participants filled out a questionnaire, which was ostensibly concerned 
with self-image. First they were asked to indicate their sex and ethnic background. To 
measure independent and interdependent attitudes and values, participants were then 
presented with the Singelis scale (Singelis, 1994), which consists of 24 items with a focus 
either on participants’ independent or interdependent self-construal (e.g., “I’d rather say 
No directly, than risk being misunderstood” as an example for an item with an independent 
focus, Cronbach’s alpha a = .68, e.g., “It is important for me to maintain harmony within 
my group” as an example for an item with an interdependent focus, Cronbach’s alpha a = 
.67). All responses were made on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.  
Next, participants were asked to imagine a scenario that addressed the following 
case: According to the news some months ago, in Belgium, Europe, dental care products 
containing fluoride were no longer being sold. The reason for the prohibition of fluoride-
containing products was evidence on the potential harm to health by fluoride in higher 
doses. Participants were asked to imagine that in the United States dental care products 
containing fluoride could no longer be sold for the same reason and only dental care 
products without fluoride were available. To assess participants’ feeling of reactance we 
asked the following questions: (1) How reasonable would a prohibition like that appear to 
you?, (2) How much would a prohibition like that bother you?, (3) How much would you 
feel restricted in your freedom of choice?, (4) How legitimate would a prohibition of 
fluoride-containing dental care products appear to you?, (5) How much would you like to 
decide by yourself what kind of dental care product you use? ([1] not at all, [10] very 
much). As in Study 1 we created a composite measure for the experience of reactance, 
which consisted of these 5 items (items 1 and 4 inverted). Cronbach’s alpha was a = .81.4 
Results 
                                                
4 The items on the reactance scale in Study 2 were slightly different from the ones in Study 1 for reasons of 
adapting them to the reactance manipulation. 
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Following previous research that investigated self-relevant attitudes and values 
using the Singelis scale (e.g., Holland, Roeder, van Baaren, Brandt, & Hannover, 2004; 
Pöhlmann et al., 2007), we created a difference score between the z-standardized scores on 
the interdependent and independent subscales. Consequently a positive value indicated 
relatively more interdependent attitudes and values and a negative value indicated 
relatively more independent attitudes and values. We then checked whether the two groups 
(cultural background: European Americans and Asian Americans) differed with regard to 
this measure: European Americans showed no significant difference score (M = 0.11, SD = 
1.16; not different from zero, t(260) = 1.52, p = .13), indicating a relative balance between 
interdependent and independent attitudes and values, whereas Asian Americans showed a 
significant positive difference score (M = 0.43, SD = 1.13; different from zero, |t(58)| = 
2.94, p = .005), indicating relatively higher interdependent than independent attitudes and 
values. The difference-scores of the two groups also differed significantly from each other, 
t(318) = 1.96, p = .05. 
Next, after having supported the assumption that the cultural group of Asian 
Americans showed more interdependent attitudes and values compared to the group of 
European Americans, we tested whether the two ethnic groups differed with regard to the 
experience of reactance.  A t-test showed that the European American participants (M = 
6.27, SD = 2.05) experienced significantly more reactance than the Asian Americans (M = 
5.71, SD = 1.42), t(117,28) = 2.44, p = .02, d = .32.5 In addition, there was a negative 
correlation between the difference-score between interdependent and independent attitudes 
and values and reactance aggregating over both European and Asian Americans, r = – .14, 
p = .01, indicating that more independent attitudes and values were generally associated 
with more reactance in response to a threat to individual freedom. 
Our main prediction was that self-related attitudes and values would be a better 
predictor of reactance than cultural background. We therefore expected that when entering 
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the difference score between interdependent and independent attitudes and values into the 
regression equation, the influence of cultural background should be reduced, while the 
attitudes and value measure should emerge as a better predictor of reactance. Consequently 
we next analyzed the data using two-step hierarchical regression analyses: Cultural 
background was entered in Step 1. In Step 2 the difference score was entered in the 
regression model. The results yield support for our hypothesis (see Table 2): The main 
effect of cultural background was significant at Step 1, β = – .11, p = .05, indicating that an 
Asian American cultural background was associated with less reactance. When the 
difference score between interdependent and independent attitudes and values was entered 
into the model, this relation became a bit weaker, β = – .10, p = .09, whereas the attitudes 
and values measure turned out to be a better and significant predictor of reactance, β = -
.13, p = .02, indicating that more independent attitudes and values were associated with 
more reactance. The final regression model, F(2, 317) = 4.72, p = .01, d = .24 was 
significant, and the improvement of the model after entering the self-related attitudes and 
values as a predictor also was significant, F(1, 317) = 5.51, p = .02, d = .26.  
Discussion 
The results of Study 2 replicated the finding that individualistic (compared with 
collectivistic) participants experienced more reactance when their personal freedom was 
threatened. This time Asian Americans experienced less reactance than European 
Americans regarding a threat to the use of dental care products, which was a threat that did 
not involve a person toward whom people could feel obliged. As hypothesized, this 
difference appeared to be rooted in the differences in culturally determined attitudes and 
values as measured by the Singelis (1994) self-construal scale. This scale was associated 
with cultural background and was shown to be a better predictor of reactance than cultural 
background. In accordance with our predictions, people with relatively more 
interdependent attitudes and values experienced less reactance, when faced with a threat to 
                                                                                                                                              
5 We also checked whether gender had an effect on the dependent variable. However, this was not the case. 
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their personal freedom than those with more independent attitudes and values. We 
acknowledge that culture is a group level variable with little variance across participants, it 
can only take values of 0 or 1, so it may not seem surprising that the attitude and value 
measure explained more variance than the binary culture variable. However, the fact that 
the independent and interdependent attitudes and values could empirically be shown to be 
a better predictor of reactance in a sample comprising people with different cultural 
backgrounds, underlines the core of the argument made above: differences in the self (as 
measured here via self-related attitudes and values) seem to be the key variable underlying 
cross-cultural differences in the experience of reactance.  
Even though differences in the self-related attitudes and values were related to 
cultural differences and both were associated with differences in reactance, we did not find 
evidence for mediation here. This might be due to the fact that we did not measure 
cognitions induced by a specific situation but rather more stable dispositions in form of 
people’s attitudes and values. However, in Study 3 we will use a cognitive priming method 
and show that situationally activated independent vs. interdependent cognitions lead to 
corresponding results.  
We are also aware that by measuring cultural specific attitudes and values we only 
capture part of the phenomena of culturally determined selves, which in addition reflect 
“differences in the theories of being and reality” (Markus & Kitayama, 2003a, p. 280). 
However, the core of our argument is that culture emerges as a distal influence on 
reactance, whilst the culturally determined self seems to function as a more proximal 
factor. Using scales that measure self-related attitudes and values we were able to capture 
the phenomena of collectivistic and individualistic orientations more closely to the 
psychological process of interest.  
STUDIES 2 A AND B 
What is more, even though the different cultural groups differ with regard to the 
extent to which their self-related attitudes and values can be characterized as being more 
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independent or interdependent, the self of each person usually comprises both independent 
and interdependent aspects and both can be activated within a person (Gardner, Gabriel, & 
Lee, 1999). Building on this argumentation, we should be able to show a similar pattern of 
associating greater reactance with a more independent self in a purely collectivistic sample 
– but only if the individualistic aspect of the threatened freedom is apparent. In contrast, if 
the collectivistic aspect of the threatened freedom is dominant, the opposite pattern should 
occur: the more interdependent the self, the greater the reactance. 
To test these predictions we conducted two smaller studies of a similar design with 
college students in a relatively more collectivistic culture, namely in Taiwan (e.g., 
Oyserman et al., 2002). In these two studies we examined (a) how self-related attitudes and 
values were associated with reactance when the choice for a product with an individualistic 
appeal – here: pearl milk tea – was restricted (Study 2 A). And (b) how self-relevated 
attitudes and values were associated with reactance when the choice for a traditional 
product catered to family consumption, i.e., a good with a more collectivistic appeal – here 
the traditional green tea – was threatened (Study 2 B). Although in general tea is often 
consumed with friends and family, these specific teas nevertheless represent different kinds 
of tea, some with a more collectivistic and others with a more individualistic appeal. Green 
tea is usually served in a teapot that is shared with others sitting at a table at home or in a 
restaurant, whereas pearl milk tea is purchased in single portion plastic cups from teashops 
on the street. Also, it comes in an abundance of forms and flavors, providing an 
opportunity to express individual preferences. In contrast to green tea, which has a long 
tradition, pearl milk tea is a relatively new drink, which appeared around 1980 and since 
then has been an especially popular drink for young Taiwanese.  
STUDY 2 A 
Pearl milk tea paradigm. Forty-one undergraduate students (23 female and 17 
male, one missing value), 34 from National Chung Cheng University at Chia Yi, Taiwan, 
and 7 from National Cheng Kung University at Tainan, Taiwan, completed a packet of 
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questionnaires after class, one of which contained the current study. Participants first 
responded to 20 statements from the horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism 
scale (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis, 1995; Triandis, Chan, 
Bhawuk, Iwao, & Sinha, 1995), assessing self-related independent and interdependent 
attitudes and values (Items like “I often do my own thing”, “I usually sacrifice my self-
interest for the benefit of my group”, responses on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 9 = 
strongly agree). We aggregated the horizontal and vertical collectivism items (a = .75) and 
the horizontal and vertical individualism items (a = .57) and next collapsed these items – as 
in Study 2 – into a difference score, with higher scores indicating more interdependent 
self-related attitudes and values. Participants were then asked to read the following 
vignette: “Imagine that an international health organization decides that pearl milk tea is no 
longer being sold, as was reported in the news some months ago. The reason for the 
prohibition of pearl milk tea is that there is evidence that some elements contained in pearl 
milk tea can be harmful to health when consumed in higher doses.” This was followed by a 
measure of experienced reactance consisting of similar items as in the Study 2 adapted to 
the tea scenario and translated into Taiwanese (Cronbachs alpha a = .64): (1) How 
reasonable would a prohibition like that appear to you?, (2) How much would a prohibition 
like that bother you?, (3) How much would you feel restricted in your freedom of choice?, 
(4) How legitimate would a prohibition of pearl milk tea appear to you?, (5) How much 
would you like to decide by yourself what kind of tea you drink? ([1] not at all, [10] very 
much). A correlation analyses between the calculated difference score and reactance 
showed that more independent attitudes and values in the Taiwanese participants were 
associated with a greater experience of reactance in the case of the prohibition of an 
individualistic good: pearl milk tea, r = – .33, p = .04. 
STUDY 2 B  
Green tea paradigm. Forty undergraduate students (27 male and 12 female, 1 
missing value), 16 from National Chen Chi University at Taipei, Taiwan, and 24 from 
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National Chung Cheng University at Chia Yi, Taiwan completed a packet of 
questionnaires after class, one of which contained the current study. Here, participants also 
first responded to statements from the horizontal and vertical individualism (Cronbach’s 
alpha a = .76) and collectivism scale (Cronbach’s alpha a = .64), assessing the independent 
and interdependent attitudes and values. Again we calculated the difference score. 
Participants were then asked to read the following vignette: “Imagine the Health Ministry 
would decide that green tea is no longer being sold, as was reported in the news some 
months ago. The reason for the prohibition of green tea is that there is evidence that some 
elements contained in green tea can be harmful to health when consumed in higher doses.” 
This was followed by a composite measure of reactance which contained more items than 
our usual measure: (1) How much would a prohibition like that bother you?, (2) How 
angry would you be about a prohibition like that?, (3) How likely is it that you would 
protest against such a prohibition?, (4) How legitimate would a prohibition of green tea 
appear to you?, (5) How much would you like to decide by yourself what kind of tea you 
drink? (6) How likely is it that you would continue drinking green tea in spite of the 
prohibition? (7) How appropriate does this prohibition appear to you? (8) How much do 
you like green tea? (9) How important is green tea for you? (10) How important is green 
tea in your family? (11) How frustrated would you be about a prohibition of green tea? 
(Cronbach’s alpha a = .71).6 This time – as predicted and in contrast to Study 2 A using the 
Pearl Milk Tea paradigm – we found a positive correlation of r = .38, p = .015, indicating 
that in the case of a threat to a more collectivistic good relatively more interdependent self-
related attitudes and values were associated with greater reactance.  
                                                
6 Using the usual combination of reactance items ((1) How reasonable would a prohibition like that appear to 
you?, (2) How much would a prohibition like that bother you?, (3) How much would you feel restricted in 
your freedom of choice?, (4) How legitimate would a prohibition of green tea appear to you?, (5) How much 
would you like to decide by yourself what kind of tea you drink?) as dependent variable, the correlation with 
the difference score (interdependent minus independent attitudes and values) was very similar, r = .36, p 
=.02, however, because the Cronbach’s alpha for this measure was unacceptable low, we above reported the 
data for the extended reactance scale.  
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A significant difference between the two correlation coefficients of the Green Tea 
and Pearl Milk Tea study, |z |= 3.20, p < .001, underlines the opposite effects of the more 
individualistic vs. more collectivistic threat on the experience of reactance among our 
collectivistic participants. Taken together, these two studies adds to Study 2 and provide 
additional cross-cultural evidence for the role of self-related attitudes and values in the 
experience of reactance when freedom of choice is threatened. Moreover, they also match 
the results from Study 1: The type of freedom that is threatened (individual vs. collective) 
has a specific impact on the experience of reactance. The finding that this depends on the 
prevalence of independent or interdependent aspects of the self suggests that the self is 
indeed a more proximal variable than the distal dimension of cultural group. 
STUDY 3 
In order to provide further evidence for the crucial role of the self in understanding 
reactance effects in a cross-cultural context, we conducted a priming study. As the self of 
each person usually comprises both independent and interdependent aspects (Gardner et 
al., 1999), it should be possible to activate the respective parts of the self with a cognitive 
priming procedure (for an overview see Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Thus Study 3 tested to 
what extent priming of independent vs. interdependent values influenced the experience of 
reactance in a similar manner as shown in the previous studies, and thereby improve causal 
evidence with respect to the role of the self-related attitudes and values. To do this, we 
created a scenario, in which participants were asked to imagine booking a holiday trip and 
again varied whether the travel agent threatened participants’ individual or collective 
freedom. We predicted that after an interdependent (compared to an independent) prime 
people would show less reactance if their individual freedom was threatened but more 
reactance if their collective freedom was threatened. 
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were sixty-two students (24 males and 38 
females) who were recruited on the campus of the Ludwig-Maximilians-University in 
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Munich, Germany. The experiment was based on a 2 (priming: activation of independent 
vs. interdependent values) x 2 (threat: individual vs. collective) between-subjects design. 
The data of three participants had to be excluded from the analyses because they did not 
follow the instructions regarding the priming task. 
Procedure. Participants were asked to participate in a study on personality and 
decision-making behavior. If they agreed they were given a questionnaire, which started 
with some general questions (e.g., sex, nationality). After some brief instructions on 
idiosyncratic self-descriptions, participants engaged in a task designed to activate 
independent vs. interdependent values by Trafimov, Triandis, and Goto (1991). 
Participants in the independent priming condition were asked to describe the ways in 
which they were different from their family and close friends. In the interdependent priming 
condition participants were asked to describe the ways in which they were similar to their 
family and close friends. Afterwards the decision-making scenario was presented: 
Participants were told to imagine that with regard to their up-coming holidays, they had 
spent the entire weekend comparing conceivable destinations of their next trip. For this 
purpose, they had been investigating countless catalogues before they decided upon 
spending their summer holidays in Greece. When they went to a travel agency to book 
their trip, a travel agent approached them by imposing his recommendations on them, 
thereby varying the individual vs. collective threat to participants’ freedom. The agent in 
the individual threat condition attempted to talk them out of their decision to go to Greece 
by addressing them personally. For example, he emphasized that they personally would not 
have fun in Greece. Instead, they should book a holiday trip to Spain, because that would 
be the right choice to make for them personally. The collective threat condition depicted 
the same conversation with the travel agent, but focused on their relation to their partner. 
For example, he stressed that they and their partner would not have fun in Greece and as a 
consequence, they and their partner should book their trip to Spain.  
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We measured the participants’ experience of reactance by asking the following 
questions: (1) How legitimate would a recommendation by a travel agent appear to you? 
(2) How much would you feel restricted in your freedom of choice? (3) How reasonable 
would such a recommendation appear to you?, (4) How much pressure would you feel to 
book the recommended trip to Spain?, (5) How much does the recommendation by the 
travel agent bother you?, (6) How appropriate would such a recommendation seem to 
you?, (7) How likely would you be to get a recommendation somewhere else first? , 
Participants responded to this set of questions on a scale from 1 = not at all to 10 = very 
much. We created a scale for participants’ experienced reactance by aggregating the items 
listed above (a =.687). 
Results 
We first conducted a 2 (priming: activation of independent vs. interdependent 
values) x 2 (threat: individual vs. collective) ANOVA. This analysis showed the predicted 
interaction between priming and kind of threat, F(1, 55) = 4.51, p = .04, d = .57 (see Table 
3 for the means).8 Simple effects analyses revealed that when participants were confronted 
with a threat to their individual freedom, they reported more reactance when independent 
compared with interdependent values had been activated, F(1, 55) = 3.99, p = .05, d = .54. 
In contrast, when they were confronted with a threat to their collective freedom, this 
difference disappeared, F(1, 55) = 1.07, p > .30. Looked at differently, following the 
interdependent prime, participants reported more reactance with regard to the collective 
compared to the individual threat, F(1, 55) = 4.89, p = .03, d = .60, however, following the 
independent prime participants did not significantly differ depending on whether the threat 
was individual or collective, F(1, 55) < 1, p > .40.  
                                                
7 The Cronbach’s alpha is based on the data of n = 167 participants. We initially utilized two different 
priming methods in this study (one was taken from the literature, see above, and the other one construed in 
our lab). Both primings yielded very similar results on the dependent variable. However, for the reason of 
simplicity in the current paper we only report the data of the first method.  
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Discussion 
The results of Study 3 are in line with our previous studies. Activating independent 
vs. interdependent values yielded similar effects on the experience of reactance as 
operationalizing self-related aspects by assessing different cultural groups or chronic 
measures of self-related attitudes and values. Again we found that people reacted very 
differently to the threat of their independent vs. interdependent freedom depending on the 
activation of independent vs. interdependent values.  
Now, being confident about the role of self-related attitudes and values in the 
differential arousal of reactance, we return to our initial and more general research 
question: Can reactance theory be generalized across cultures? So far we have learned that 
we need to differentiate between different kinds of threat: Using different cultural groups 
(Study 1) as well as activating interdependent values (Study 3) led to the finding that 
collectivists showed less reactance than individualists when their individual freedom was 
threatened. However, collectivists reacted more strongly when their group’s or their 
interpersonal freedom was in danger. To provide further evidence for the notion that threat 
to individual versus collective freedom will lead to reactance as a function of cultural 
background, in Study 4 we attempted to replicate the results from Study 1, manipulating 
whether participants were faced with a threat to their personal versus their group’s 
freedom. In addition to assessing the experience of reactance, in Study 4 we also assessed 
behavioral intentions that ought to follow from reactance. We utilized a help-giving 
paradigm in which participants’ personal freedom vs. the freedom of their group was 
threatened.  Previous studies have illustrated that requests for help can threaten people’s 
freedom to decide whether they want to help or not and accordingly can induce reactance 
(e.g., Berkowitz, 1969; for overview see Brehm & Brehm, 1981). We proposed that people 
from an individualistic cultural background would experience more reactance with regard 
                                                                                                                                              
8 We also checked whether there were any effects of gender but found no reliable effect. There was neither a 
main effect nor a two-way interaction. The three-way interaction, however, was significant, F(1, 51) = 6.24, 
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to a threat to their individual freedom than people from a collectivistic cultural 
background. However, collectivists should experience reactance when their collective 
freedom was threatened. Finally, we expected participants’ inclination toward help-giving 
to be lower the greater their reactance. 
STUDY 4 
Method 
Participants and design. The participants were ninety one (49 male and 42 female) 
students from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). The experiment was 
based on a 2 (threat: individual vs. collective) x 2 (cultural group: European American vs. 
Asian/Latin Americans) factorial between subjects design. Our sample consisted of 51 
European Americans, 22 Asian Americans, and 18 Latin Americans. 
Procedure.  Participants were asked to participate in a study on self-image and 
help-giving behavior. If they agreed they were given a questionnaire that began with some 
general questions regarding their sex, ethnic background and nationality. Next, participants 
responded to the 20 statements from the horizontal and vertical individualism and 
collectivism scale described in Study 2 A (Singelis et al., 1995; Triandis, 1995; Triandis et 
al., 1995). We aggregated the horizontal and vertical individualism items (a = .64) and the 
horizontal and vertical collectivism items (a = .78) and calculated the difference score. 
Next, participants were asked to imagine a scenario regarding the UCLA parking 
lot. In the individual threat condition participants were asked to imagine that on their way 
to the parking lot, a student they recognized from one of their classes approached them and 
asked for a favor: She was currently conducting research that required frequent access to 
the Biomed Library. She did not have a parking pass for a parking lot close to the Biomed 
Library, but would like to park her car in this parking lot temporarily. Because she did not 
know anyone else to ask, she asked the participant to lend her his/her parking pass for a 
week and offered the participant to switch to a less accessible lot for which she owned a 
                                                                                                                                              
p = .02, but because of the few male participants per cell this was difficult to interprete. 
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permit. If the participant agreed, he/she could not use his/her parking lot for a week, but 
would have helped the student have faster access to the library.  
In the collective threat condition participants imagined they read an announcement 
concerning a parking issue on their way to the parking lot: a tennis tournament, which was 
organized by an automobile firm, would be taking place on the UCLA campus at the end 
of the month. Consequently, parking space was needed to accommodate the cars of the 
tennis players, their staff and visitors for one week. To facilitate this need, the firm had 
requested that UCLA designate one parking lot to the tournament. If UCLA agreed to 
provide this favor, the UCLA students, faculty and staff could not use their parking lot for 
a week (instead they were offered to switch to another less accessible lot), but would have 
helped the tournament's players, staff and visitors have faster access to the tournament.  
After participants had read the scenario they were asked to answer to the following 
items: (1) How reasonable would a favor like that appear to you?, (2) How restricted would 
you feel in your freedom of choice?, (3) How legitimate would a favor of lending your 
parking pass to an acquainted student appear to you?/How legitimate would the favor of 
lending the parking lot to the automobile firm, which organizes the tennis tournament, 
appear to you?; (4) How much would you feel under pressure by being told you would be 
the only one that can help?/How much would you feel under pressure by being told that 
UCLA is the only institution that can provide this favor?, (5) How much would a favor like 
that bother you?, and (6) How irritated would you probably feel by a request like that? 
These items assessed the participants’ experience of reactance (α = .80). Help-giving was 
assessed by the following two items: How willing are you to help the student? / How 
willing would you be to support this request? and How likely is it that you will help the 
student? / How likely is it that you will support this request? (r =.89). All responses were 
made on a scale from 1 = not at all to 10 = very much. In the end participants were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results  
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Sample characteristics. A t-test for the difference score on self-related attitudes and 
values revealed that the European Americans indicated more independent than 
interdependent attitudes and values (M = -0.43, SD = 1.46; different from zero, t(50) = 
2.11, p = .04), whereas Asian Americans/Latinas/os indicated relatively more 
interdependent than independent attitudes and values (M = +0.20, SD = 1.24, though not 
significantly different from zero, p > .30). As expected, the difference-scores of European 
and Asian Americans/Latinas/os were significantly different from each other, t(89) = 2.20, 
p = .03.9 
Analyses for the experience of reactance. Next, we conducted a 2 (threat: individual 
vs. collective) x 2 (cultural background: European American vs. Asian American/Latina/o) 
ANOVA on the reactance measure. We found a marginally significant main effect for 
threat, F(1, 87) = 3.03, p = .09, d = .37, which was qualified by a two-way interaction of 
threat and cultural background, F(1, 87) = 6.78, p = .01, d = .56.10 (See Table 4 for the 
means.) Simple effects analyses showed that the Asian Americans/ Latinas/os again 
reacted with lower reactance when confronted with an individual threat than the European 
Americans, F(1, 87) = 4.90, p = .03, d = .47. In contrast, with regard to a collective threat 
the Asian Americans/ Latinas/os tended to show even more reactance than European 
participants, although this difference failed to be significant, F(1, 87) = 2.15, p = .15, d = 
.31. For the Asian Americans/ Latinas/os the collective threat led to significantly more 
reactance than the individual threat, F(1, 87) = 8.46, p = .005, d = .62, whereas for the 
European Americans the two kind of threats did not differ, F < 1, p > .50.  
Analyses for help-giving. For help giving the 2 (threat: individual vs. common) x 2 
(cultural background: European American vs. Asian American/Latina/o) ANOVA found a 
                                                
9 The Asian American vs. Latina/o group of participants did not differ significantly with regard to 
independent versus interdependent attitudes and values, F(1, 38) < 1, p > .55. 
10 We also checked whether there were any effects of gender and found that women experienced more 
reactance (M = 6.60, SD = 1.96) than men (M = 5.32, SD = 1.84), F(1, 83) = 13.14, p < .001. This was 
especially the case for the collectivistic participants, as a significant two-way interaction indicated, F(1, 83) = 
6.34, p = .01. However, as the above reported two-way interaction between cultural background and kind of 
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main effect for threat, F(1, 87) = 10.95, p = .001, d = .71, which was qualified by an 
interaction between threat and cultural background, F(1, 87) = 4.44, p = .04, d = .45. (See 
Table 5 for the means.) Simple effects analyses showed that although there was no 
difference in helping intentions for European Americans when they faced an individual 
versus a collective threat to freedom, F < 1, p = .40, there was a difference in helping 
intentions for Asian American/Latina/o participants: here a threat to the collective parking 
freedom led to significantly less helping than a threat to individual parking, F(1, 87) = 
4.93, p = .029, d = .48.  
Mediation analysis. We next tested, following Baron and Kenny (1986), whether 
people’s willingness to help was mediated by the experience of reactance: The first 
regression analysis showed that the independent variable (the interaction between cultural 
group and kind of threat) significantly influenced the mediator (experience of reactance), β 
= .47, |t(87)| = 2.60, p = .01. In the second regression analysis the mediator significantly 
predicted a decreased willingness to help, β = –.64, |t(89)| = 7.76, p < .001. In the final step 
we examined whether statistical control for the mediator reduced the predictive power of 
the interaction between cultural group and kind of threat on help giving. Without the 
mediator the interaction term was significant, β = –.38, t(87) = 2.17, p = .03. When 
controlling for the mediator, however, the interaction was no longer significant, β = –.11, 
t(86) < 1, p > .45, although, importantly, the regression weight for the mediator continued 
to be significant, β = –.59, |t(86)| = 7.00, p < .001. Finally, the Sobel-test (Sobel, 1982) 
confirmed that the mediator carried the influence of the interaction between cultural group 
and kind of threat to help giving (the indirect effect of the interaction term on help-giving 
via the experience of reactance was significantly different from zero, z = 2.44, p = .001). 
Discussion 
                                                                                                                                              
threat remained significant if gender was included in the analysis, F(1, 83) = 8.96, p = .004, and there was no 
significant three-way interaction, F < 1, p > .80, we did not further consider these gender effects.  
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The results of Study 4 replicated our previous findings: Participants with a 
collectivistic cultural background, again, experienced less reactance with regard to 
situations in which their individual freedom was threatened. Nevertheless, they 
experienced increased reactance when the freedom of their group, namely all people from 
UCLA using the parking lot, was at stake. With regard to the consequences of intercultural 
differences in the experience of reactance, Study 4 provided an important addition: We 
were able to show that the experience of reactance was linked to a behavioral intention, 
namely help giving. The same pattern that we found for the interaction between type of 
threat and cultural background in the experience of reactance was also present for helping 
intentions. Finally, cultural differences in people’s help giving behavior were mediated by 
differences in the experience of reactance.  
As in Study 4 we had also measured participants’ self-related attitudes and values 
(using the vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism items by Triandis and 
colleagues) we also tested whether these more proximal measures were better predictors 
for the experience of reactance than the more distal measure of cultural background (see 
Footnote 11 for the results11). Here, we only found an interesting result for the participants 
with a collectivistic cultural background: For those with even stronger interdependent 
attitudes and values, a threat targeted at an individual freedom was accompanied by less 
reactance, whereas a threat that was targeted at a collective freedom was accompanied by 
                                                
11 To further explore the difference in reactance when facing an individual versus a collective threat in 
relation to the self we conducted regression analyses including participants’ independent vs. interdependent 
attitudes and values. Unfortunately, the interaction between type of threat and independent vs. interdependent 
attitudes and values did not reach significance, p = .15. However, looking at the two cultural groups 
separately, for the Asian American/Latina/o participants the regression model was significant, F(3, 39) = 
4.48, p = .009. Most importantly, the interaction of type of threat and interdependent vs. independent values 
was marginally significant, β = .48, p = .055. Simple slopes analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) showed that type 
of threat predicted the experience of reactance when attitudes and values were more interdependent, β = .61, 
p = .001, but not when they were more independent, β = .12, p = .60. Looking at the simple slope graph 
(Figure 1), it becomes apparent that for participants with more interdependent attitudes and values (greater 
difference score), a collective threat led to more reactance than an individual threat, whereas this was not the 
case for participants with more independent attitudes and values. (For the European American participants 
the regression analysis was not significant, all ps > .50, which is in accordance with the results from the 
ANOVA).  
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more reactance. This is another piece of evidence suggesting that the type of threat and its 
relation to a person’s self need to be considered when predicting reactance.12 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In the current article we aimed to embed reactance theory in a cross-cultural 
context. We started with the observation in the existing literature that people with a more 
individualistic, independent self (compared to more collectivistic people) appear to be 
more likely to experience reactance when an individual freedom is threatened as usually 
tested in reactance studies (e.g. Buboltz et al., 1999; Imajo, 2002; Savani et al., 2008). We 
then reasoned that people with a collectivistic cultural background, who have a more 
interdependent understanding of the self and who might feel less threatened by restrictions 
of their individual freedom, would nevertheless show reactance when faced with a threat to 
the freedom of their ingroup. Therefore, we asked whether the predictions derived from 
reactance theory could be applied to people from both individualistic and collectivistic 
cultural backgrounds when differentiating between the type of freedom being threatened. 
In accordance with this idea, Study 1 showed that although collectivists reacted to a threat 
addressing their individual freedom with less reactance (compared to individualists), they 
showed strong reactance when the threat addressed a collective freedom.  
We then reasoned that a more proximal variable to understand cross-cultural 
differences in reactance would lie in the direct assessment of people’s self-related attitudes 
and values. Taking into account that the experience of reactance is tightly related to the self 
(Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 2004; Worchel, 2004), we suggested that 
                                                
12 With regard to helping as dependent variable, the corresponding interaction term was not significant in the 
regression analyses (all p’s > .38). The finding that self-related attitudes and values were not involved in the 
relation between culture and type of threat with regard to helping might be due to the fact that help-giving 
was directed toward an out-group in this paradigm (the automobile firm). The interdependent self being 
rather positively associated with the ingroup (Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988) should 
relate strongly to reactance when the ingroup’s freedom is threatened (as we have seen with regard to our 
measure of the experience of reactance). However, we think the refusal of help-giving to out-group members 
should not be associated as strongly with the self as the immediate experience of reactance. This is in line 
with results of Oyserman (1993), who looked at collectivism and individualism in Arabs and Jews in Israel, 
and found Arabs to be slightly more collectivistic than Jews in general and at the same time agreeing more 
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differences in the experience of reactance between people from individualistic versus 
collectivistic backgrounds should be rooted in differences in the culturally determined 
selves. In Study 2 we therefore examined the relation between the experience of reactance 
in the face of a threat to an individual freedom and the self, finding more independent self-
related attitudes and values more predictive of reactance. Two smaller correlational studies 
provided equivalent and complimentary findings in samples from a relatively more 
collectivistic culture. Study 3 finally established causal evidence for the mediating role of 
the self on the emergence of reactance by activating independent vs. interdependent 
attitudes and values with a priming method.  
Lastly, in Study 4, we looked at the relation of threats to both individual and 
collective freedom, cultural background and additionally taking behavioral variables into 
account. We replicated the previous findings and furthermore showed that behavior in the 
form of subsequent help-giving intentions was mediated by the experience of reactance. In 
addition, we found for those from a collectivistic background that threat to a collective 
freedom led to greater experience of reactance when the self was more interdependent. 
Both Studies 1 and 4 suggested that people from collectivistic cultures felt less threatened 
only with regard to the elimination of freedom addressing their independent self. Yet, with 
regard to the elimination of freedom addressing their interdependent self they yielded 
strong reactance effects. 
We are aware that we need to interpret our results with caution, because all 
experiments were based on hypothetical scenarios. However, with the results showing a 
consistent pattern among different scenarios (helping responses to an ingroup member, i.e. 
business colleague or fellow student, and more traditional notions of reactance, telling 
someone what to do on a trip, or restricting a consumer choice) we are led to conclude they 
could also be replicated with real behavior in future research. Another limitation of our 
                                                                                                                                              
with the item “A man of character helps his group before all else.” In this sense collectivism seems to be 
more closely related to helping the ingroup than to not helping the out-group. 
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research is that the results for the collectivists pertain mainly to collectivists living in 
predominantly individualistic societies. However, we think that the differential response to 
the individual versus collective threat based on the independent vs. interdependent attitudes 
and values we found in our participants still raises important theoretical issues for 
understanding the phenomenon of cross-cultural reactance.  
Theoretical Implications 
The current research suggests that paying attention to culture specific features can 
help improve psychological theories. Although culture has increasingly been taken into 
account in research and textbooks in social psychology, culture has so far primarily been 
addressed in a diversity sense and not in the sense of basic psychological processes (Miller, 
1999). Yet researchers have already noted that well-known psychological theories such as 
cognitive dissonance theory or reactance theory may need modification in order to be 
applicable to non-individualistic cultures (e.g., Iyengar & Lepper, 1999; Worchel, 2004). 
In this context, it is important that culturally sensitive theories do not simply reduce culture 
to an environmental factor but understand culture as an active ingredient in the formation 
of psychological processes (Miller, 1999). 
In our research we aimed to integrate culture specific aspects of the self into 
reactance theory. Worchel (2004) suggested that reactance theory might benefit more than 
many other psychological theories from a program of cross-cultural research because it 
deals with personal freedom, an issue that often defines and separates different cultures. 
However, although reactance theory stands and falls with the concept of freedom, little has 
been said about the meaning of freedom within reactance theory. In this research we aimed 
to extend the understanding of reactance processes by incorporating culturally different 
aspects into the definition of freedom. We found that independence is linked to reactance 
in the presence of threat to individual freedom and interdependence is linked to reactance 
in the presence of threat to collective freedom. The essence of our findings is twofold: 
First, it increases our confidence that threats to personal freedom meet less reactance in 
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interdependent than in independent contexts. At the same time, it teaches us that reactance 
is not a phenomenon restricted to individualism or independent attitudes, as previous 
research might have suggested (Buboltz et al., 1999; Dowd et al., 1994; Iyengar & Lepper, 
1999; Savani et al., 2008).  
Finding less reactance when associating interdependence and individual threat is a 
conceptual replication of the research by Savani et al. (2008), who found that people from 
a collectivistic background (people from India) also reacted with less reactance to a 
personal threat. In our studies we were able to link this phenomenon even more directly to 
interdependent attitudes and values. What is it about interdependence that leads to less 
reactance following a threat to personal freedom? According to the disjoint vs. conjoint 
model of agency (Markus & Kitayama, 2003b), people may not experience reactance when 
they are limited in their personal choices and act within the conjoint understanding of 
action because culturally defined normatively good actions are driven by significant others 
who symbolically complete the self. Therefore expectations from others and obligations to 
them are seen as motivating instead of being a force or pressure. In this line of reasoning 
another interpretation of our results seems possible: People might have experienced less 
reactance when confronted with a threat to their independent freedom because they felt an 
obligation toward an ingroup member. This could have been the case in at least two of our 
studies, because here participants were asked to do a favor for a person they knew, either 
because it was a work colleague or a student colleague. This is in accordance with Brewer 
and Chen’s (2007) observation that collectivism can in fact operate at an interpersonal 
relational level rather than a generalized group level. However, in Study 2 collectivistic 
participants were also not affected by a threat to their independent freedom, although no 
other person was involved whom they could have felt connected to. In Study 3 the 
restricting person was a travel agent and therefore unlikely to be considered a close 
ingroup member. These findings support our argument that the interdependent self was less 
bothered by infringement of personal freedom than collective freedom.  
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The second theoretical implication of our research is related to the fact that we do 
indeed find reactance for collectivists – but only if collective aspects of freedom are 
threatened. This poses a problem to Savani et al. (2008)’s notion that “Reactance theory is 
rooted in the disjoint model of agency …“ (p. 870). Based on our findings we propose that 
reactance theory can also be applied to people acting in the context of the conjoint model. 
If agency is conceptualized in terms of collectives such as groups, families or organizations 
(e.g., Morris, Menon, & Ames, 2001), taking away a group freedom feels threatening. Also 
when agency is primarily conceptualized as coming from being in relationships, taking 
away an interpersonal freedom is experienced as threatening. Thus, restrictions to social 
groups or relationships induce reactance because here the conjoint agency is threatened. 
We confirmed this idea for the two instances, threats to groups (Studies 1 & 4) and threats 
to people in relationships (Study 3). However, in future research further specifications will 
be fruitful when looking at threats to conjoint agency. For example, it might be also 
important to look whether the source of a threat comes from an out- or the ingroup. 
With our findings we support Markus and Kitayama (2003b)’s emphasis that in the 
conjoint model there is not less agency compared to the disjoint model.There is agency and 
there are agents, but there is a different style of personal agency that has an interpersonal 
source, yet is felt by the individual as affecting the world intentionally. This bears 
implications for reactance theory because different kinds of threat should induce reactance 
(those focusing on the independent freedom relevant for disjoint agency vs. those focusing 
on the interdependent freedom relevant for conjoint agency). If reactance is understood as 
“a motivational state designed not only to restore freedom, but also to reestablish identity” 
as suggested by Worchel (2004, p.111), the definition of people’s identity becomes crucial, 
either in the form of disjoint or conjoint agency. Culture influences people’s attitudes and 
values and therefore contributes to their understanding of self and identity – and this 
determines how and when they experience threats to their freedom.  
Practical implications 
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Our research is especially relevant considering the development of multi-cultural 
societies. When people live and work together threats to freedom are often unavoidable. 
They may occur in legislation, politics, within organizations, at the workplace or in 
education. Of course in most situations these threats are experienced as unpleasant, and 
often they are also experienced as arbitrary and unjustified. This leads to resistance against 
these often inevitable changes. However, in a multi-cultural society this state of affairs 
might even be more complicated and it might be even more difficult to overcome resistance. 
Based on different understandings of the selves, misunderstandings can arise when people 
with different cultural backgrounds communicate with each other. Therefore, we need to 
improve our understanding of how resistance to change arises in a multi-cultural society 
and how resistance can be overcome with the help of culture specific interventions.  
One could think of a variety of interventions relevant in different contexts. 
Preliminary data from our lab, for example, suggest that when people’s freedom is 
threatened collectivists seem be more strongly affected if they think about collective 
benefits or costs instead of individual ones (Jonas, Niesta, Graupmann, & Traut-Mattausch, 
2008). Another idea might be to employ a culture specific self-affirmation intervention (see 
Steele, 1988). Data from a pilot study indeed show that a collective self-affirmation 
manipulation was more effective in reducing reactance for collectivists than an 
independent self-affirmation manipulation (Traut-Mattausch, Jonas, & Graupmann, 2008). 
More research, however, is needed with regard to interventions designed to overcome 
resistance to change that is due to reactance. 
Conclusion 
In the time of globalization, internationalization and multi-cultural teams in 
organizations and politics, the question of how universal reactance processes are is highly 
relevant. Something what is considered as a threat to one’s freedom in one culture might be 
considered to be legitimate in a different culture. Increasing our knowledge about such 
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different perspectives is important wherever people live in the conflict between having the 
privilege of freedom but at the same time facing unavoidable constraints to freedom. This 
is the case, for example, where intercultural teams work together and where different 
cultural groups are affected by new laws or educated in one school system. 
Our research suggests that the concept of freedom can be better understood in a 
cross-cultural context if culture specific aspects of the self and related attitudes and values 
are considered. These play an important role for understanding reactance processes. They 
seem to influence the different perception of threats to people’s freedom, as well as the 
different meaning that is attributed to these threats. This view of understanding reactance 
in a cross-cultural context can be embedded in the framework recently suggested by 
Oyserman and Lee (2008), to understand culture producing situated cognition on the one 
hand, and on the other hand leading to the internalization of certain values and thinking 
styles, which are chronically available as a result. 
The findings reported in this article underline the importance of cross-cultural 
research regarding reactance theory. Although reactance processes seem to be cross-
culturally variable on the surface, they seem to have similar underlying mechanisms. In our 
research we have discovered both similarities and variations in the experience of reactance 
that can be understood by incorporating culture specific aspects of the self in reactance 
theory. We believe that in conducting cross-cultural research, it is important to identify the 
underlying mechanism on which cultural differences are based. This way cross-cultural 
implications for different psychological theories might be better understood and 
psychological theories can be improved. 
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Figure captions 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Simple slopes for high versus low difference score interdependent – independent 
attitudes and values for Asian American/Latina/o participants in Study 4. 
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Table 1: 
Means and standard deviations for the experience of reactance in Study 1 
 
 threat 
 individual  collective 
cultural background M SD  M SD 
 
Western Europeans 
 
 
East Asians 
 
 
6.54 
(n = 33) 
 
5.38 
(n = 19) 
 
 
1.43 
 
 
1.84 
 
  
5.89 
(n = 34) 
 
6.08 
(n = 19) 
 
 
0.95 
 
 
0.90 
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Table 2: 
Regression analysis for the experience of reactance in Study 2 
 
  
 
Beta 
    
Step Variable entered Step 1 Step 2 R2 Model F Δ R2 Δ F 
1. Cultural 
background 
– .11* – .10  .01     3.88 
2. Difference score 
interdependent – 
independent 
attitudes and 
values 
   – .13** .03 4.72 .02 5.51 
* p = .05; ** p = .02 
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Table 3: 
Means and standard deviations for the experience of reactance in Study 3 
 
 
 threat 
 individual  collective 
Activation of attitudes and values M SD  M SD 
 
independent self prime 
 
 
interdependent self prime 
 
 
6.73 
(n = 11) 
 
5.67 
(n = 13) 
 
 
1.55 
 
 
1.50 
 
  
6.32 
(n = 18) 
 
6.72 
(n = 17) 
 
 
1.11 
 
 
1.04 
 
 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
Culture, Self, and Reactance 
 
4 
Table 4: 
Means and standard deviations for the experience of reactance in Study 4 
 
 threat 
 individual  collective 
cultural background M SD  M SD 
 
individualistic participants 
 
 
collectivistic participants 
 
 
6.11 
(n = 30) 
 
4.81 
(n = 17) 
 
 
1.87 
 
 
2.07 
 
  
5.75 
(n = 21) 
 
6.61 
(n = 23) 
 
 
2.09 
 
 
1.74 
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Table 5: 
Means and standard deviations for help-giving in Study 4 
 
 threat 
 individual  collective 
cultural background M SD  M SD 
 
individualistic participants 
 
 
collectivistic participants 
 
 
5.60 
(n = 30) 
 
7.32 
(n = 17) 
 
 
2.54 
 
 
2.19 
 
  
4.98 
(n = 21) 
 
4.33 
(n = 23) 
 
 
2.82 
 
 
2.58 
 
 
 
 
